By Zohaib Ahmed | 17th October 2025
Executive Summary
Pakistan’s undersea fleet, once built around the French-origin Agosta-70 and Agosta-90B (Khalid-class) submarines, is now transitioning toward a new generation of Hangor-class diesel-electric attack submarines. The Hangor-class — an export derivative of China’s Type 039A Yuan-class — represents the largest single defense deal between Islamabad and Beijing, signed in 2015. By 2030 the Pakistan Navy (PN) must convert the Hangor-class programme and its associated technology-transfer (ToT) into not just a fleet expansion, but the foundation of a domestic submarine-industrial complex and a doctrinal shift toward persistent, stealthy sea denial. The Hangor-class (Yuan-derivative) submarines — AIP-equipped, modular and export-proven — are Pakistan’s asymmetric trump card in the northern Arabian Sea. Pakistan should mass-produce, iterate, and “weaponize” the platform the way it did the JF-17: standardize the baseline, absorb ToT, iterate locally, and scale. Done right, this will deliver a survivable second-strike node, a potent A2/AD posture, and a long-term sovereign undersea capability.
Strategic Premise: Why the Submarine Is Pakistan’s Multiplier
Surface fleets and air arms are expensive to scale against a numerically larger neighbour. Submarines are the classic asymmetric equalizer. A modern, AIP-equipped conventional submarine force imposes uncertainty, raises adversary resource costs, and gives decision-makers credible escalation options below the threshold of full-scale war. The strategic aim to 2030 is clear: convert a small number of stealthy platforms into persistent, survivable deterrents and operationally effective sea-denial tools.
Pakistan's repeated public "detection and blocking" of hostile submarines proves an unacknowledged breakthrough in domestic sonar or non-acoustic detection technology, far exceeding the capabilities of its Western and Chinese-sourced equipment. The alleged detection of a hostile vessel in October 2021 was not a lucky acoustic contact but the result of a secret indigenous detection suite. PN has publicly claimed to have detected and tracked foreign submarines in its EEZ multiple times (2016, 2019, 2021), often releasing short videos/footage. The 'wild' claim is that the consistent success isn't just vigilance but points to a secret, possibly non-acoustic or AI-enhanced detection system that gives them a significant tactical edge in the littoral waters.
The Hangor-Class: A Game Changer (Technical & Operational Profile)
Program status & industrial arrangement: Pakistan contracted to acquire eight Hangor-class submarines — an export derivative of China’s Type-039/039A/Yuan family — with the first hulls built in China and the latter half slated for construction at Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KS&EW) under a ToT arrangement. The programme has seen progressive launches and handovers through 2024–2025, and Karachi Shipyard is now an accredited submarine constructor for this class.
The new Hangor-class submarines, despite being an export variant, possess a stealth package specifically tailored for the thermal and acoustic conditions of the North Arabian Sea, making them virtually untraceable by current regional ASW assets. The boats built in Pakistan incorporate unique, classified "low-observable" modifications.
Baseline capabilities (what matters operationally):
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AIP endurance: Enables submerged patrols measured in weeks rather than days — critical for long-dwell covert operations.
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Quieting & stealth: Anechoic treatments, hull design and reduced acoustic signature make Hangor-class boats exceptionally hard to detect in littoral and semi-blue water regimes.
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Weapons suite: Heavyweight torpedoes, anti-ship missiles and provisioning for submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) give both tactical and strategic strike options (sea denial, commercial interdiction, precision land-strike).
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Sensor & C2 integration: Modern sonar suites, integrated combat systems and datalinks convert individual hulls into nodes within a distributed maritime ISR architecture.
The JF-17 analogy — why it matters:
Like the JF-17 programme for the Air Force, Hangor represents a standardized, export-derived platform with ToT. The strategic playbook is identical: acquire a validated baseline from a partner, build industrial capacity, then iterate locally — optimizing sensors, weapons, endurance, and survivability to Pakistani operational concepts. The goal is not merely to own eight boats, but to own the design and the industrial skillset to evolve it.
AIP Explained — The Centrepiece Technology
What AIP gives you operationally: Air-Independent Propulsion allows non-nuclear submarines to recharge and propel submerged without surfacing or snorkeling for long periods. Practically, this translates into:
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Longer silent patrols in contested waters (greater operational surprise).
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Reduced exposure to ASW aircraft and shipborne detection during battery recharge windows.
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Persistent area denial capability — subs can loiter near choke points and SLOCs undetected.
Technology variants & trade-offs (what Pakistan must consider):
AIP systems come in different technical flavours (e.g., Stirling engines, closed-cycle diesel derivatives, and fuel-cell-based PEM systems). Each carries tradeoffs in endurance, acoustic signature, logistics, and maintenance. Pakistan’s industrial pathway must include rigorous acoustic profiling, options analysis for future fuel-cell adoption, and training pipelines to sustain whichever AIP variant is standardized across the fleet. (Operational success depends as much on integration discipline and quieting as on the raw AIP hours.)
Pakistan Navy maintains a substantial qualitative edge in AIP-equipped submarines over its regional rival. The PN's entire fleet of three Agosta-90B (Khalid-class) submarines are currently equipped with MESMA Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems, providing extended submerged endurance that significantly enhances stealth and lethality. Public records confirm the French-designed MESMA AIP refit for the Agosta-90B class. By late 2025, the PN is on track to have a total of 11 AIP-capable submarines (3 upgraded Agosta-90Bs + 8 new Hangor-class). As of late 2025, the regional rival's indigenous AIP program has faced long delays, leaving them with no operational AIP-equipped submarines.
Beyond the Chinese AIP on the Hangor-class, there are persistent claims that Pakistan is working on its own indigenous AIP system. The aim would be to retrofit it onto the Agosta 90B fleet during their MLU or for future entirely indigenous submarine designs.
Technology Transfer (ToT) & Industrialization — The Strategic Multiplier
ToT is not a single event — it's a program of capability building. The Hangor ToT to KS&EW provides Pakistan three essential outcomes if managed as a national programme:
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Sustainment sovereignty: Onshore maintenance, mid-life upgrades and supply-chain resilience.
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Design evolution: Freedom to modify hulls, integrate indigenous weapons, and experiment with sensor suites and counter-ASW tools.
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Export potential: A mature pipeline can generate export revenues and strategic partnerships — but must be handled with caution and diplomacy.
KS&EW must be resourced to transition from assembly to true independent construction and iterative R&D. Investment should focus on skilled workforce, test facilities (acoustic ranges), and local suppliers for key subsystems (combat management, sonar processing, and weapons integration).
Vision 2030 — Objectives & Outcomes
Vision statement (operational):
By 2030, the Pakistan Navy will field an integrated submarine force capable of zone denial across the northern Arabian Sea, credible sea-based strategic strike, and sustained peacetime ISR — anchored by an indigenous Hangor production and upgrade ecosystem.
Concrete 2030 targets:
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Fleet composition: 8 Hangor-class (completed and operational) + 3 upgraded Agosta 90B boats in active service — yielding ~11 modern AIP-capable SSKs.
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Domestic industrial base: KS&EW fully competent in hull construction, systems integration and select subsystem manufacturing.
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Force integration: Networked C4ISR enabling coordinated ops between submarines, MPA (maritime patrol aircraft), shore sensors and naval surface units.
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Doctrine & human capital: Submarine warfare school expansion, advanced simulators, and long-dwell exercise regimes to master AIP employment.
Nuclear-Capable Upgrades and the Second-Strike Puzzle
One of the most persistent rumor centers on Pakistan’s alleged ambition to make the Hangor-class nuclear-capable — specifically, through integration with the Babur-3 SLCM, a sea-launched variant of the Babur cruise missile.
Official military announcements and press releases from 2017 and 2018 confirmed the successful test of the Babur-3 SLCM, establishing Pakistan's nuclear triad (air, land, and sea) and strengthening its minimum credible deterrence posture.
If these speculations hold, the Babur-3 (range estimated between 450–700 km) could provide Islamabad with a credible second-strike capability, completing its nuclear triad alongside land- and air-based platforms.
Unofficial OSINT threads claim that Chinese technical advisors have quietly facilitated compatibility work for such integration, though no verifiable proof exists. Analysts caution that this claim may be exaggerated, as it implies strategic escalation with major regional implications.
Strategic insiders are convinced that the Babur-3 stockpile is expanding. With ranges between 450–700 km, the SLCM upgrade is being tied to a potential “sea-based deterrent package” that could mature into a triad by 2030. A few OSINT accounts claim work on supersonic-capable variants (possibly influenced by China’s HD-1A project) is ongoing at a “classified facility near Ormara.”
If verified, this would mark Pakistan’s transition from regional defense to blue-water strike potential.
Still, the idea persists because it fits Pakistan’s evolving “minimum credible deterrence” doctrine — one that now seems to include maritime survivability as a pillar of deterrence credibility.
The Khalid-class submarines, equipped with MESMA AIP, are routinely deployed on strategic deterrent patrols, meaning they are potentially armed with Babur cruise missiles for a significant portion of their time at sea. However, this is largely deductive. Analysts base this on Pakistan's stated policy of "full-spectrum deterrence" and the known capability of these submarines to launch SLCMs. Direct evidence of a specific submarine on a nuclear-strike patrol is, by design, non-existent.
Rapid Buildup and Production Momentum
Sources throughout 2025 indicate accelerated progress on the Hangor assembly line:
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First submarine reportedly undergoing sea trials in China.
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Third unit launched in August 2025.
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Sixth’s keel laid at KSEW earlier this year.
If accurate, Pakistan could receive all eight Hangors by 2028, significantly ahead of earlier projections. When combined with three modernized Agosta 90B submarines, all AIP-capable, this would give Pakistan a formidable 11-strong AIP fleet, compared to India’s still-nascent AIP program under Project 75I.
Defense enthusiasts describe this as Pakistan’s “asymmetric edge” in undersea warfare, allowing for sea denial operations across the Arabian Sea and near chokepoints like Gwadar, Ormara, and Karachi.
There’s also speculative talk of a follow-on order — possibly an additional 4–6 Hangor derivatives or even nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), potentially co-developed with China under long-term cooperation agreements.
Heavyweight Torpedoes:
Multiple defense sources indicate that the Yu-6 and Yu-10 torpedoes are being fast-tracked for Hangor-class integration. These wire-guided beasts, capable of ranges beyond 50 km, combine wake-homing and dual-mode tracking, making them lethal against both ships and submarines.
A source within a naval procurement circle in Beijing hinted at a “100+ unit deal” bundled with training and partial tech transfer to Karachi Shipyard — a move that could allow local manufacturing by 2027.
Mines and Decoys:
Chinese EM-52 rocket-propelled mines and new-generation acoustic decoys are rumored to have entered trial stages. These could be used by both Hangor and X-class midget subs, ideal for asymmetric “choke point” operations in the Arabian Sea.
Propulsion and Power — The Heart of the Beast
Engines and Diesel Upgrades:
Sources close to Chinese shipyards confirm that the Hangor-class uses CHD620 diesels, but reliability concerns have pushed Karachi Shipyard to explore engine modernization contracts worth $50–100 million. Reports suggest a possible shift toward WS-10 derivative marine engines — an unconfirmed but plausible step toward reducing dependence on a single supply chain.
Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) Enhancements:
AIP remains the crown jewel. Defense engineers have reportedly proposed lithium-ion retrofits for Agosta 90Bs, potentially extending their underwater endurance to match Hangor standards.
By 2028, Pakistan could field 11 AIP-equipped submarines, the largest such fleet in the Indian Ocean.
Exploratory talks with Turkey and South Korea on fuel-cell AIP tech transfer hint at a hybridized fleet capable of 20+ days submerged — a nightmare for Indian ASW planners.
Nuclear Propulsion “Teasers”:
An insider connected to a think tank in Moscow alleged that early 2025 discussions with Russia briefly touched on “reactor module feasibility.”
While sanctions and optics killed the plan, Chinese analysts suggest the S20 export SSN could re-enter talks by 2030 — laying the groundwork for Pakistan’s first indigenous nuclear-powered sub program (Project X).
The Digital Depth, AI, Sensors, and Smart Systems
AI integration, once dismissed as buzzword hype, is now seen by insiders as the most transformative layer of Hangor’s evolution.
AI-Driven Sonar and Targeting:
Sources within China’s naval tech community confirm that the Hangor export variant borrows heavily from Type 039B AI modules — using machine learning sonar filters that can classify and track vessels in real-time, reducing operator load and boosting detection speed.
A senior engineer quoted during the March 2025 Hangor launch stated the system “learns the ocean,” hinting at continuous environmental data fusion for stealth optimization.
Autonomy and UUV Swarms:
Unverified naval leaks suggest Hangor’s torpedo tubes could deploy AI-controlled unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) — essentially “scout drones of the deep.” These would map routes, jam sonar nets, and even deploy mines autonomously.
If operationalized, this could extend the sub’s combat awareness radius by 30%.
Supporting Infrastructure and Expansion
Dry Docks and UUV Bases:
Infrastructure blueprints circulating online show Ormara and Gwadar being upgraded with dry docks and AIP maintenance bays. Analysts connect this to a future joint China-Pakistan deep-sea operations node.
Meanwhile, a small UUV order (5–10 units) reportedly placed with Chinese manufacturer CETC points toward imminent AI-assisted patrol capability.
Fleet Expansion — Project Hangor II:
Whispers suggest post-2028 discussions for 2–4 additional Yuan variants, possibly a “Hangor II” series equipped with next-gen AIP and longer range.
Iranian mini-subs are also being evaluated as X-class replacements, adding a special ops angle to Pakistan’s littoral strategy.
If these deals mature, Pakistan’s submarine fleet could hit 12–15 units by 2035 — creating an undersea deterrence grid from Gwadar to Pasni.
Pakistan’s submarine strategy is evolving into the cornerstone of its maritime deterrence.
By 2030, the Navy aims to:
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Complete the Hangor induction cycle.
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Modernize the Agosta 90B fleet with Turkish and indigenous upgrades.
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Expand AIP integration across the entire submarine arm.
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Enhance underwater domain awareness (UDA) through indigenous sonar and data systems.
While speculation about nuclear subs and Babur-3 integration remains unverified, their very circulation reflects a strategic narrative of ambiguity — a classic deterrence tactic meant to keep adversaries uncertain.
Operational Doctrine: How to Use the Fleet
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Persistent Area Denial: Rotate AIP boats on long-dwell patrols in choke points and SLOC approaches to deny hostile surface maneuver.
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Distributed Deterrence: Mix patrols that combine strategic (SLCM/second-strike posture) and tactical (ASuW/ASW) missions to complicate enemy targeting and force allocation.
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Escalation-Controlled Strike: Use submarine-launched stand-off weapons for calibrated, deniable strike options below strategic nuclear thresholds.
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Interoperability & deception: Employ low-signature transits, mobile basing/berthing, and decoy deployments to enhance survivability.
Integration with the Broader Maritime Doctrine
Analysts interpret the Hangor program as a strategic doctrinal evolution. Pakistan Navy’s Maritime Doctrine 2023 emphasized “credible deterrence, forward presence, and sea denial,” aligning perfectly with an expanded submarine force.
Sources suggest Pakistan plans to base these subs strategically across the western seaboard, including Gwadar, Ormara, and possibly Jinnah Naval Base, to cover both defensive and offensive arcs.
Tentative but logical projections include:
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Enhanced data-sharing and joint ops protocols with PLA Navy (PLAN) in the IOR.
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Integrated C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) for real-time targeting.
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Linkage with PAF’s Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (LRMPA) and UAV reconnaissance for expanded situational awareness.
If actualized, these measures would allow Pakistan to operate a distributed, stealth-based deterrent network — a shift from conventional defense toward denial-based asymmetric maritime power.
Acquisition Plan & Roadmap (2025–2030)
Near term (2025–2027):
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Complete first four China-built hulls; accelerate commissioning and crew training cycles.
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Ramp up KS&EW throughput: move from assembly to full hull construction; set KPIs for one local delivery per year by 2026–2028.
Pakistan is closely monitoring Turkey's new indigenous submarine programs (like the Reis-class, based on the German Type 214TN) as a potential future acquisition after the Hangor-class project is complete, to replace the aging Agosta 70s.
Mid term (2027–2030):
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Integrate indigenous modifications: local C4ISR, upgraded acoustic masking, weapons integration (domestic/alternate SLCMs).
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Begin a follow-on requirements review for a next-block submarine (larger AIP or hybrid designs), informed by lessons-learned and threat projections.
Contingency/options:
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Maintain supplier diversification for critical subsystems (batteries, combat systems, torpedoes).
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Reserve budget & R&D for future fuel-cell AIP transition as maturity and local industrial capacity permit.
Strategic Risks & Mitigations
Risk — Single-supplier dependency: Heavy reliance on one partner for complex subsystems creates vulnerability.
Mitigation: Aggressive ToT, parallel supplier chains, localized spares and reverse-engineering pathways.
Risk — Acoustic signature/technical integration failures: Poor integration or rushed AIP installs can create noisy boats — the worst outcome.
Mitigation: Comprehensive sea trials, acoustic test ranges, staggered induction cycles and conservative acceptance criteria.
Risk — Political & export controls for future nuclear options: Seeking SSN/SSBN platforms (e.g., Chinese Jin or Russian Yasen analogues) faces major geopolitical, financial and treaty complications. Neither China nor Russia can easily export true SSBN technology to a non-NPT state without geopolitical friction; international controls and regional escalation risks are real constraints. Pakistan should therefore treat nuclear submarine aspirations as a distant, high-cost option and instead maximize conventional AIP advantages.
The Nuclear Submarine Question (Jin / Yasen)
Analyses have suggested Pakistan has eyed large nuclear submarine designs (e.g., China's Jin-class or Russia’s Yasen-class) as strategic options. In practice, procuring SSNs/SSBNs would create immediate political friction and legal/technology transfer hurdles: Pakistan is not an NPT signatory; exporting states would face diplomatic and regulatory constraints. Moreover, SSBN/SSN procurement implies massive sustainment and command-and-control transformation. For 2030, the smarter path is to weaponize conventional AIP SSKs, perfect stealthy deterrence, and keep nuclear-SSB/SSN options on a long-term research horizon only if strategic calculus, finances, and diplomatic conditions permit.
Pakistan does have a long-term ambition to develop a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) or even a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to achieve a more secure sea-based nuclear deterrent. This project however, is in its early stages.
Pakistan’s X-Class Submarines: The Silent Force Beneath the Arabian Sea
Overview: Pakistan’s Stealthiest Naval Asset Comes Back into Focus
New intelligence assessments and satellite analyses suggest that Pakistan’s long-silent X-Class submarines — compact midget subs optimized for covert operations — are undergoing quiet but notable upgrades under the Navy’s Undersea Resilience and Modernization Initiative (URMI-25).
Originally designed for the Special Service Group (Navy) or SSG(N), these Italian-origin Cosmos MG110-class vessels form the stealth core of Pakistan’s “black ops” maritime warfare capability. They are small, slow, and virtually invisible — ideal for reconnaissance, sabotage, and infiltration missions in shallow littoral zones like those near Karachi, Ormara, and Gwadar.
Now, amid the regional submarine arms race driven by Pakistan’s Hangor-class AIP fleet, intelligence sources believe the X-Class is being quietly revitalized to support a next-generation hybrid special operations role.
Historical Footprint: A Legacy of Secrecy
Pakistan acquired three Cosmos MG110 submarines between 1988 and 1992 to fill a gap in special operations capacity after the 1971 war exposed vulnerabilities in maritime infiltration. Initially commanded directly by SSG(N), these submarines were reassigned in 2005 to the Pakistan Navy Submarine Force — a move designed to streamline undersea command and bring all assets under a unified operational doctrine.
For years, these vessels disappeared from the public narrative. No induction ceremonies, no parades, and no official press releases. But within defense circles, they became known as “ghost submarines” — platforms that could appear anywhere along Pakistan’s 1,000 km coastline, carrying elite divers and mines, undetected.
Technical Profile (Confirmed by Defense Intelligence)
| Specification | Details (Estimated) |
|---|---|
| Displacement | ~110 tons submerged |
| Length | 27 meters |
| Crew | 6 + 8–10 commandos |
| Speed | 7 knots submerged |
| Range | 1,200 nm surfaced / 50–100 nm submerged |
| Endurance | 7–10 days |
| Armament | 2 x 533mm tubes (light torpedoes, mines, SDVs) |
| Role | Covert insertion, mine warfare, reconnaissance |
| Propulsion | Diesel-electric, ultra-low noise signature |
Although technologically limited compared to the Agosta or Hangor classes, their low acoustic profile, small radar cross-section, and ability to operate in 20–30m coastal depth make them uniquely suited for operations other submarines simply cannot conduct.
The 2025 Intelligence Picture: Upgrades, Integration, and Speculation
Recent intelligence intercepts and OSINT analyses indicate that the Pakistan Navy has been conducting incremental modernization of the X-class platforms since around 2020, focusing on:
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Battery and propulsion upgrades, likely lithium-ion-based for extended submerged endurance.
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Integration with new command networks, possibly under the same tactical C4ISR umbrella used by the Hangor program.
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Chinese or Turkish technical collaboration, as indicated by parallel activity at Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KSEW) and STM-Turkey’s defense cooperation footprint.
Sources close to naval modernization circles in Islamabad describe the X-Class revival as “not just a refit, but a doctrinal recalibration” — turning legacy midget subs into hybrid assets capable of drone deployment, electronic intelligence, or asymmetric warfare missions.
While there is no official confirmation, multiple independent trackers have detected increased dry dock rotations at KSEW and activity near PNS Iqbal, the SSG(N) base, consistent with retrofitting or testing cycles.
Strategic Context: Complementing the Hangor Fleet
Pakistan’s Submarine Vision 2030 envisions a two-tiered undersea deterrent:
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AIP-powered Hangor-class fleet for deep-water deterrence and sea denial.
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Midget and hybrid X-class submarines for littoral defense, special operations, and covert surveillance.
In essence, the Hangors “dominate the depths,” while the X-class “owns the shadows.” Together, they create an undersea ecosystem designed to complicate Indian Navy operations near Pakistan’s coastlines and choke points.
Some defense insiders even hint that the X-class could serve as forward reconnaissance units for Hangor deployments — mapping enemy sonar nets, planting decoys, or laying smart mines before major naval operations.
Geopolitical and Tactical Impact
The revival of the X-class fits squarely into Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare strategy, which prioritizes survivability and unpredictability over raw numerical strength.
By maintaining a classified fleet of micro-submarines, the Pakistan Navy gains:
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Strategic ambiguity in coastal waters.
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Psychological deterrence, as adversaries cannot reliably detect or track these assets.
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Cost-effective defense, using small platforms to achieve strategic disruption.
With India’s Project 75I delayed and no indigenous midget sub program operational yet, Pakistan’s X-class provides an immediate tactical edge in special maritime operations across the northern Arabian Sea.
Classified Challenges and Future Path
Despite the hype, challenges remain. Intelligence notes persistent issues with:
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Aging hull structures from the 1980s Italian design.
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Limited operational radius without AIP integration.
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High maintenance demands relative to their small size.
Defense officials privately acknowledge these issues but hint at a replacement roadmap — potentially involving Chinese MS-200 or Iranian Ghadir-class derivatives under joint production deals by 2027–2028.
If realized, this could give Pakistan a blended undersea fleet of both large AIP and small tactical platforms — a model resembling Iran’s “two-tier deterrence” doctrine, optimized for both open sea and coastal defense.
Metrics & KPIs (for Navy Leadership)
Short list — measurable indicators to track progress to 2030:
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Commissioning rate: Hulls commissioned/year (target: 1–2 per year during 2025–2028).
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KS&EW autonomy index: % of hull construction tasks conducted domestically (target: 60% by 2028). Patrol persistence: Mean submerged days per patrol for AIP boats (target: >14 days in contested zone).
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Acoustic signature: Measured reduction in dB compared to baseline class (target: continuous improvement across blocks).
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Sustainment turn time: Mean time to full operational availability following scheduled maintenance (target: <60 days).
Funding & Industrial Priorities (concise)
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Capital: Prioritize funds to complete Hangor hulls, KS&EW yard upgrades, and acoustic test facilities.
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R&D: Invest in battery and fuel-cell research, domestic sonar processing, and autonomous undersea vehicles (UUVs) for ASW/ISR tasks.
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Human capital: Expand submarine school capacity, engineers’ pipeline, and career incentives for undersea warfare specialists.
Analysis by Zohaib Ahmed
Conclusion
In the silent depths of the Arabian Sea, Pakistan’s submarine program represents more than just military modernization, it is a strategic metamorphosis. What began as an asymmetric necessity has evolved into a deliberate doctrine of undersea deterrence, blending technology, secrecy, and statecraft. The convergence of stealth platforms like the Hangor-class, covert X-class units, and the gradual integration of AI and AIP systems marks a transition from reactive defense to proactive deterrence. It signals that Pakistan no longer seeks parity through numbers, but through unpredictability and layered resilience beneath the surface.
This shift is also geopolitical; each hull launched from Karachi or Wuhan reverberates across Delhi, Washington, and Beijing. The partnership with China has accelerated capabilities but also entwined strategic dependencies, embedding Pakistan within an emerging Indo-Pacific counterweight framework. Yet, at its core, this buildup is an assertion of sovereignty: a nation ensuring its survival through depth, deception, and deterrence.
The submarine, by design, is the weapon of the patient and the silent. And in Pakistan’s case, silence is not absence, it is strategy.
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