Decoding Jaishankar’s Afghan Outreach

 

Pakistan’s Moment, the Jaishankar–Muttaqi Overture in an August 2025 Scenario

By Zohaib Ahmed | 29 August 2025

Setting the stage (brief): In this August 2025 scenario Pakistan sits at the centre of a new regional consensus, embraced by Washington, courted by Moscow (steel-mill + rail corridors), deepening CPEC 2 ties with Beijing, warming with the GCC and Central Asia, and pushing an Africa engagement. India, by contrast in this scenario, is reeling from a strategic collapse and diplomatic isolation. Into that landscape comes another diplomatic ripple: India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has held ministerial-level contact with Afghanistan’s acting foreign minister, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi — the first of its kind since the Taliban return — and reports in August 2025 show Kabul’s planned travel to Pakistan ran into UN/US procedural hurdles. These concrete touchpoints matter because symbolism meets structural reality. Khaama NewsAnadolu AjansıDawn

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The grand strategic frame — desperation dressed as diplomacy

Diplomacy is a function of leverage. In our August 2025 tableau, the tactical phone call is an attempt at re-entry — New Delhi signaling to audiences at home and abroad that it can still play the regional balancing act. But the key point would be that gestures cannot undo tectonic shifts. If Pakistan truly anchors the great-power convergences — from Washington’s security cooperation to Moscow’s industrial ties and Beijing’s deep infrastructure investments — then India’s outreach to Kabul reads less like restoration and more like damage control. This is classic realpolitik: the metric is not press releases but logistics, supply lines, sanctions waivers, and who controls the viable routes for trade, aid, and influence. Jaishankar’s call matters — but only as an indicator of intent, not of immediate structural reversal. X (formerly Twitter)

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Optics, credibility and the domestic narrative

If we would zoom out on narrative and legitimacy. We’d note that New Delhi will spin the contact as a diplomatic breakthrough, especially given Afghanistan’s historic ties with India — but international audiences now calibrate credibility with capacity. The question isn’t whether India can talk to Kabul (it can); it’s whether India still has the economic and security instruments that make Kabul pivot. In August 2025, with Kabul’s external dependencies shaped by Pakistan, China and Gulf cashflow, a single ministerial call is more symbolic than substantive. It would warn Western commentators to avoid over-interpreting optics: ceremonial contact can coexist with deep structural dependence elsewhere, and the headlines don’t change that balance overnight. The Indian ExpressICWA

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Tactical intelligence, the “India card” as leverage, not salvation

If we would be blunt and surgical. From an intelligence perspective, Kabul’s flirting with New Delhi is an instrument — not an alliance. Afghanistan has historically used external options (India, Pakistan, Iran, Gulf) to extract concessions and secure transit, aid, and autonomy. I would see India’s overture as Kabul pressing a bargaining chip: provoke a reaction in Islamabad, win short-term material concessions, or signal independence from any single patron. But my clincher is the global audience: if Washington, Moscow and Riyadh are prioritizing Pakistan’s stability and projects — and if Pakistan can withstand the pressure — then the “India card” becomes a bargaining tool for Kabul, not a strategic pivot that displaces Pakistan. Intelligence shows that such manoeuvres create episodic ripples but rarely overturn the maritime and overland arteries that determine regional power. Khaama NewsDID PRESS AGENCY

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What this means for Islamabad, confidence, calibration, and public posture

Together the lesson is crisp: treat the Jaishankar–Muttaqi engagement as manageable noise rather than existential threat. For Pakistan the options are threefold:

1. Contain the optics, control the narrative. Let bilateral Pakistan-Afghanistan channels do the heavy lifting — amplify cooperation projects (trade facilitation, border management, energy/transit) that bind Kabul economically to Islamabad.

2. Leverage international partnerships. Convert goodwill from Washington/Moscow/Beijing/GCC into practical instruments (sanctions waivers for trade corridors, investment guarantees, multilateral development packages) that make Afghanistan’s dependence durable.

3. Exploit the anxiety. Allow Kabul to use India when it must — but make those benefits conditional and institutional (e.g., transit permits, customs integration), so Kabul’s short-term pressure plays translate into longer-term ties with Pakistan.

If Islamabad responds with strategic composure rather than panic, the Jaishankar outreach will not destabilize Pakistan’s gains; it will only remind Islamabad to convert diplomatic accolades into hard infrastructure and policy wins.

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The risk landscape — what to watch next (practical indicators)

• Travel & sanction waivers: whether UN/US exemptions for Afghan travel are liberalized or remain constrained — such procedural changes shape Kabul’s mobility and hence bargaining range. DawnDID PRESS AGENCY

• Aid & investment flows: who funds Afghanistan’s infrastructure (China/Gulf/Pakistan vs. India). Capital flows are the structural levers.

• Logistics nodes: new rail/road/port initiatives linking Kabul to Pakistani terminals vs. alternate corridors — control of transit shapes allegiance.

• Security ties: intelligence cooperation and counterterrorism linkages — symbolic diplomacy without security architecture is shallow.

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Final verdict: Survival vs. Resurgence

Jaishankar’s call is understandable — India is trying to survive and regain relevance. But in August 2025’s hypothetical where Pakistan is the diplomatic magnet, India’s ministerial outreach is a strategy of illumination, not renovation. For Pakistan, the diplomatic test is now managerial: can Islamabad translate international approval into binding institutions and economic realities that make Afghanistan’s occasional outreach to India irrelevant to the balance of power? If yes, then the Jaishankar–Muttaqi moment will be a footnote; if not, it will be a recurring headache.

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Quick factual anchors (recent, verifiable)

• India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar held a ministerial-level phone call with Afghanistan’s acting FM Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi in May 2025 — the first such contact since 2021. Khaama NewsAnadolu Ajansı

• Reporting in August 2025 indicates procedural/UN travel constraints affected plans for Muttaqi’s travel to Pakistan; Pakistani officials said dates were being worked out while some outlets suggested a UN/US exemption was not granted. DawnDID PRESS AGENCY