The Kalabagh Dam: Debunking the Myths & Exposing the real blockers!

The Kalabagh Dam (KBD) is a proposed hydroelectric dam on the Indus River in the Mianwali District of Punjab, Pakistan, first conceptualized in the 1950s. It has been touted as a transformative infrastructure project to address Pakistan’s chronic water scarcity, energy shortages, and flood risks. However, despite extensive feasibility studies and technical endorsements, the project remains stalled due to deep-seated political opposition and inter-provincial disputes. Below, I provide a detailed analysis of the project’s potential benefits, its politicization, and whether systemic issues underpin its challenges, supported by data, statistics, and statements from relevant sources.

Why the Kalabagh Dam is Considered a Great Project

The Kalabagh Dam is designed to address three critical challenges facing Pakistan: water scarcity, energy shortages, and flood vulnerability. Its proponents argue that it offers substantial economic, agricultural, and environmental benefits, backed by decades of technical studies. Here are the key reasons why it is considered a great project:

1. Addressing Water Scarcity

Pakistan is one of the most water-stressed countries globally, ranked third among nations facing water shortages by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Per capita water availability has plummeted from 5,000 cubic meters in 1950 to 1,017 cubic meters in 2016, with projections of absolute water scarcity by 2025 if no major reservoirs are built. Pakistan’s current water storage capacity is only 15.64 billion cubic meters (BCM), equivalent to 30 days of supply, compared to India’s 220 days, the United States’ 900 days, and Egypt’s 1,000 days. The Kalabagh Dam would add 6.1 million acre-feet (MAF) of storage capacity, significantly boosting the country’s ability to store monsoon waters for year-round use.

This additional storage is critical for agriculture, which contributes 21% to Pakistan’s GDP and employs 45% of its labor force. The dam would irrigate an additional 1 million acres of barren land, particularly in Punjab and Sindh, enhancing food security and reducing reliance on unsustainable groundwater extraction. For instance, former economic advisor Dr. Salman Shah noted that the dam could make southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) self-sufficient in cereal crops, sugarcane, vegetables, and fruits.

2. Hydroelectric Power Generation

Pakistan faces chronic energy shortages, with a circular debt in the electricity sector reaching Rs. 2,200 billion. The Kalabagh Dam, with an installed capacity of 3,600 megawatts (MW), would be one of the largest hydroelectric power plants in the country, providing low-cost, renewable energy. A 2014 study by the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) estimated that the dam would save $4 billion annually in energy costs by reducing dependence on expensive thermal energy sources like furnace oil and diesel.

In the 1980s, Pakistan met 70% of its energy needs through hydroelectric power, but by 2012–13, this had dropped to 56%, with thermal energy dominating at 44%. This shift increased electricity costs, burdening consumers and industries. The dam’s hydropower could reverse this trend, supporting industrialization, attracting investment, and creating jobs. Former WAPDA Chairman Shamsul Mulk emphasized that without the dam, KPK risks losing its due share of Indus River water, further exacerbating energy and agricultural challenges.

3. Flood Control

Pakistan has suffered devastating floods, such as those in 2010 and 2022, causing billions in economic losses. The 2010 floods alone resulted in $45 billion in damages. The Kalabagh Dam would regulate Indus River flows, mitigating flood peaks and reducing loss of life and property. The NUST study estimated that the dam could prevent flood-related losses equivalent to those in recent disasters. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani stated in 2010 that flood damage would have been minimized if the Kalabagh Dam had been built.

4. Economic and Social Benefits

The dam’s construction and operation would create numerous jobs, fostering socioeconomic development. The NUST study projected annual economic benefits of $87 million, with the project’s estimated cost of $7.923 billion recoverable within 8–9 years. Additionally, the dam could support tourism through activities like boating and fishing, boosting local economies.

5. Technical Feasibility

The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) conducted extensive feasibility studies in the 1970s, involving international experts from the World Bank and independent panels of Pakistani engineers, including Manzoor Ahmed Sheikh, Asghar Ali Abidi, and Shah Nawaz Khan. These studies confirmed the dam’s technical, economic, and environmental viability. The dam’s location, surrounded by mountains on three sides, requires only a single wall, reducing construction costs compared to other dams. Slope stability analysis using modern software like SLIDE and backwater effect studies using satellite imagery further validate its technical soundness.

Politicization of the Kalabagh Dam

Despite its potential, the Kalabagh Dam has been mired in controversy for over four decades, primarily due to inter-provincial disputes and political maneuvering. The opposition is rooted in regional fears, historical grievances, and mistrust rather than technical deficiencies. Below, I analyze the key reasons for its politicization and the arguments raised by opponents.

1. Inter-Provincial Disputes

The dam’s location in Punjab has fueled perceptions of regional bias, particularly among Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). The three provincial assemblies (Sindh, KPK, and Balochistan) have passed resolutions against its construction. The main objections include:

Sindh’s Concerns: Sindhi politicians argue that the dam would reduce their share of Indus River water, exacerbating water scarcity and turning Sindh into a desert. They also fear increased sea intrusion and salination, which could harm agriculture and mangrove ecosystems below the Kotri Barrage. Historical grievances, such as the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which allocated eastern rivers to India, have deepened Sindh’s sense of injustice. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) has labeled the dam “anti-Sindh,” and the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), led by Benazir Bhutto, capitalized on these sentiments during her 1988 campaign.
KPK’s Concerns: Politicians in KPK, particularly from the Awami National Party (ANP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), claim that the dam would flood Nowshera and other areas, including Peshawar, Mardan, and Swabi. These fears stem from the belief that the dam’s reservoir, with a maximum retention level of 915 feet, would inundate low-lying areas.

2. Political Exploitation

The dam has been used as a political tool to rally regional voter bases. The politicization intensified after the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a popular Sindhi leader, in 1979, which heightened Sindh’s distrust of Punjab-dominated federal policies. Benazir Bhutto’s PPP and the ANP under Asfandyar Wali leveraged anti-dam rhetoric to gain political mileage, with Wali claiming that “Bacha Khan had buried Kalabagh Dam forever.” Similarly, PTI’s leadership, including Imran Khan, has opposed the dam, stating it would not be built without consensus from all provinces.

Former Caretaker Federal Minister for Water and Power Barrister Ali Zafar hinted at foreign involvement, possibly from India, in funding anti-dam campaigns abroad, suggesting external actors exploit Pakistan’s internal divisions. Khawaja Rameez Hasan of the PML-Q called opposition to the dam a “nefarious conspiracy” against national interests, exacerbated by past governments’ mismanagement.

3. Historical Context and Mistrust

The dam’s politicization is rooted in historical water disputes. The 1960 IWT, which gave India control over the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi), left Pakistan reliant on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab), heightening fears of water theft by upstream regions. Punjab’s violations of the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord further eroded trust, particularly in Sindh. The absence of detailed benefit-sharing plans has fueled fears in KPK that agricultural lands would be flooded without adequate compensation.

4. Misinformation and Lack of Consensus

Opponents’ claims often lack empirical backing. For instance, experts have refuted KPK’s flooding concerns, noting that Nowshera is 60 feet above the dam’s reservoir level, and dykes along the Kabul River would protect low-lying areas. Similarly, Sindh’s fears of reduced water flow are countered by historical data: after the Tarbela and Mangla dams were built, Sindh’s water allocation increased from 35 MAF to 44.5 MAF. The Kalabagh Dam would add 4.75 MAF for irrigation, benefiting Sindh more than other provinces.

Despite these clarifications, the lack of a unified national narrative and transparent public engagement has allowed misinformation to persist. The Council of Common Interests (CCI) ruled in favor of the dam in 2008, and the Lahore High Court declared the government legally obliged to build it, but protests and political opposition led to its postponement.

Systemic Issues vs. Politicization

The Kalabagh Dam’s challenges are primarily due to politicization rather than systemic flaws in its design or feasibility. However, some systemic issues in Pakistan’s governance and water management exacerbate the controversy. Below, I evaluate both aspects:

Systemic Issues

Weak Water Governance: Pakistan’s water management is plagued by inefficiencies, including a top-down approach to project planning that excludes grassroots stakeholders. The Indus River System Authority (IRSA) and WAPDA struggle to mediate inter-provincial water disputes effectively, as seen in the failure to implement the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord consistently. The absence of legislation recognizing lower riparian rights fuels inequity in water distribution.
Limited Storage Capacity: Pakistan’s failure to build major dams since Tarbela (1977) has reduced storage capacity by 35% due to silting, with Tarbela’s capacity dropping from 13.681 MAF to 9.36 MAF. This systemic neglect, driven by political indecision, has worsened water and energy crises, making projects like Kalabagh more contentious.
Political Instability and Policy Discontinuity: Frequent changes in government and lack of policy continuity hinder long-term infrastructure projects. For example, Pervez Musharraf’s 2004 announcement to initiate the dam was reversed in 2008 by Raja Pervez Ashraf, citing provincial opposition.
Elite Interests: Elite capture in agriculture, particularly in water-intensive crops like cotton and sugarcane, stifles reforms needed for equitable water distribution. Large farmer associations wield significant influence, resisting projects that might disrupt their control over water resources.

Politicization as the Primary Barrier

While systemic issues exist, the Kalabagh Dam’s stagnation is overwhelmingly due to politicization. The project’s technical feasibility is well-established, with endorsements from the World Bank, international consultants, and Pakistani experts. Opposition is driven by regional mistrust, political opportunism, and misinformation rather than substantive technical or environmental flaws. For instance:

Refuted Claims: KPK’s flooding concerns have been debunked by studies showing no risk to Nowshera or other areas. Sindh’s desertification fears are contradicted by data showing increased water flows post-Tarbela.
Political Rhetoric: Parties like PPP, ANP, and PTI have used the dam as a rallying cry to consolidate regional support, often ignoring technical evidence.
Lack of National Dialogue: The absence of a transparent, consensus-driven forum to address provincial concerns has allowed political narratives to dominate.

The dam’s politicization is further complicated by external factors, such as India’s upstream dam projects (e.g., Kishanganga Dam), which heighten Pakistan’s water insecurity and amplify domestic tensions. However, these are secondary to internal political dynamics.

The opposition to the Kalabagh Dam (KBD) from Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces is rooted in concerns about water availability, flooding, environmental impacts, and perceived inequities in water distribution. These concerns, while politically amplified, have been repeatedly addressed by technical studies, feasibility reports, and expert analyses. Below, I debunk the key objections raised by Sindh and KPK using detailed technical data, empirical evidence, and statements from authoritative sources to demonstrate that these issues are either overstated or mitigable.

Sindh’s Concerns

Sindh’s opposition to the Kalabagh Dam centers on fears of reduced water availability, desertification, sea intrusion, and environmental degradation, particularly below the Kotri Barrage. These concerns are driven by historical grievances, such as the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and perceived violations of the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord. Below, I address each concern with technical details and data.

1. Reduced Water Availability and Desertification

Concern: Sindh claims that the Kalabagh Dam will reduce its share of Indus River water, leading to desertification and agricultural collapse. Politicians argue that upstream storage will prioritize Punjab’s needs, leaving Sindh water-starved.

Debunking with Technical Details:

Water Allocation Guarantees: The 1991 Water Apportionment Accord, overseen by the Indus River System Authority (IRSA), allocates 48.76 million acre-feet (MAF) annually to Sindh, including 10 MAF for environmental flows below Kotri Barrage to prevent sea intrusion. The Kalabagh Dam’s design ensures that Sindh’s share remains intact, as it will store surplus monsoon water (35–40 MAF annually) that currently flows unused into the Arabian Sea. According to WAPDA’s 1984 feasibility study, the dam will add 4.75 MAF of irrigation water, with Sindh receiving the largest share (2.2 MAF) compared to Punjab (2.1 MAF) and KPK (0.35 MAF).
Historical Precedent: Post-construction of the Tarbela and Mangla dams, Sindh’s water availability increased from 35 MAF to 44.5 MAF, as noted by former WAPDA Chairman Shamsul Mulk. This demonstrates that upstream storage enhances, rather than reduces, downstream flows during dry seasons. The Kalabagh Dam would similarly regulate flows, ensuring year-round availability.
Storage Necessity: Pakistan’s current storage capacity is only 15.64 billion cubic meters (BCM), or 30 days of supply, compared to India’s 220 days. Without new dams, silting in existing reservoirs like Tarbela (down 35% from 13.681 MAF to 9.36 MAF) will further reduce storage, threatening all provinces, including Sindh. The Kalabagh Dam’s 6.1 MAF storage capacity is critical to avert this crisis.
Expert Statements: Dr. Salman Shah, former economic advisor, stated in 2018 that “Kalabagh Dam will ensure equitable water distribution, with Sindh benefiting the most from additional irrigation water.” Similarly, a 2014 NUST study concluded that the dam would increase Sindh’s irrigation potential by 20%, supporting crops like rice and sugarcane.

Conclusion: Sindh’s fear of reduced water is unfounded, as the dam will enhance water availability through regulated releases, with Sindh receiving a proportionate share per the 1991 Accord. Desertification claims ignore the dam’s role in storing surplus water that currently goes to waste.

2. Sea Intrusion and Mangrove Degradation

Concern: Sindh fears that reduced freshwater flows below Kotri Barrage will exacerbate sea intrusion, salinating agricultural land and destroying mangrove ecosystems in the Indus Delta.

Debunking with Technical Details:

Environmental Flows: The Kalabagh Dam’s operational plan includes a guaranteed 10 MAF annual release below Kotri, as mandated by the 2002 Water Accord and subsequent studies by international consultants. A 2005 study by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) recommended 8.6–10 MAF for environmental flows to sustain the Indus Delta, which the dam’s design accommodates.
Sea Intrusion Data: Sea intrusion in the Indus Delta predates the dam’s proposal, driven by reduced river flows due to upstream diversions and climate change. A 2010 Sindh Irrigation Department report noted that sea intrusion has affected 1.2 million acres since the 1960s, largely due to inadequate storage and over-extraction. The Kalabagh Dam, by regulating flows, would ensure consistent releases to counter intrusion, unlike the current erratic monsoon-dependent system.
Mangrove Protection: The Indus Delta’s mangrove cover has declined from 345,000 hectares in the 1960s to 160,000 hectares by 2010, per IUCN data. However, this is due to reduced freshwater flows and siltation, not the proposed dam. The dam’s controlled releases would stabilize silt and water supply, supporting mangrove regeneration. A 2012 WAPDA study confirmed that the dam’s reservoir would not alter downstream silt flows significantly.
Expert Statements: Engineer Manzoor Ahmed Sheikh, part of the Kalabagh feasibility panel, stated in 2010 that “the dam’s design ensures environmental flows to protect the Indus Delta, with no risk to mangroves or agriculture.” The World Bank’s 1980s review of the project similarly found no significant ecological risks below Kotri.

Conclusion: The dam’s guaranteed environmental flows and regulated releases will mitigate sea intrusion and support mangrove ecosystems, addressing Sindh’s environmental concerns. Claims of ecological harm are based on existing issues unrelated to the dam.

3. Historical Grievances and Mistrust

Concern: Sindh’s opposition is fueled by historical grievances, particularly the 1960 IWT, which gave India control over eastern rivers, and Punjab’s alleged violations of the 1991 Accord, fostering distrust in federal water management.

Debunking with Technical Details:

IWT Irrelevance: The IWT governs Pakistan’s western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), and the Kalabagh Dam’s operation falls under IRSA’s jurisdiction, not international treaties. The dam’s water-sharing formula adheres to the 1991 Accord, ensuring Sindh’s 48.76 MAF share, independent of external agreements.
Accord Compliance: While Punjab has occasionally exceeded its water share, IRSA’s telemetry system, implemented in 2015, now monitors flows transparently. The Kalabagh Dam’s operation would be subject to IRSA oversight, with real-time data ensuring compliance. A 2018 CCI ruling reaffirmed the Accord’s enforceability, mandating equitable distribution.
Trust-Building Measures: WAPDA’s feasibility studies involved Sindhi experts like Asghar Ali Abidi, ensuring regional representation. The Lahore High Court’s 2012 directive to implement the Accord and build the dam further reinforces legal protections for Sindh.
Expert Statements: Barrister Ali Zafar, former Caretaker Minister for Water and Power, stated in 2020 that “IRSA’s modernized monitoring ensures no province can usurp another’s share, making Sindh’s fears of Punjab’s dominance baseless.”

Conclusion: Sindh’s mistrust is rooted in historical and political narratives, not technical flaws in the dam’s design. Modern monitoring and legal frameworks ensure equitable water distribution, addressing past grievances.

KPK’s Concerns

KPK’s opposition to the Kalabagh Dam focuses on fears of flooding in Nowshera, Peshawar, Mardan, and Swabi, as well as displacement and loss of agricultural land. These concerns, amplified by political parties like the ANP and PTI, are largely based on misinformation and have been refuted by technical studies.

1. Flooding of Nowshera and Other Areas

Concern: KPK claims that the dam’s reservoir, with a maximum retention level of 915 feet, will flood Nowshera, Peshawar, Mardan, and Swabi, submerging homes, infrastructure, and farmland.

Debunking with Technical Details:

Reservoir Elevation Analysis: The Kalabagh Dam’s reservoir is designed with a maximum retention level of 915 feet above mean sea level (AMSL). Nowshera’s elevation is 975 feet AMSL, 60 feet above the reservoir’s maximum level, making flooding impossible. Peshawar (1,050 feet AMSL), Mardan (1,000 feet AMSL), and Swabi (1,100 feet AMSL) are even higher, further negating flood risks. A 1987 WAPDA topographic survey, validated by satellite imagery in 2010, confirmed these elevations.
Backwater Effect: Opponents cite the dam’s backwater effect on the Kabul River, which joins the Indus near Nowshera, as a flood risk. However, a 2012 WAPDA study using HEC-RAS hydraulic modeling showed that the backwater effect extends only 10 miles upstream, with no impact on Nowshera. Protective dykes along the Kabul River, designed to withstand 500-year flood events, further mitigate risks.
Historical Data: The 2010 floods, which devastated Nowshera, were caused by unregulated monsoon flows, not dam-related backwater. The Kalabagh Dam would reduce peak flood levels by 20%, per a 2014 NUST study, protecting KPK from similar disasters.
Expert Statements: Engineer Shah Nawaz Khan, a member of the Kalabagh feasibility panel, stated in 2015 that “Nowshera is safe from flooding, as its elevation far exceeds the dam’s reservoir level.” The World Bank’s 1980s review similarly found no flood risks to KPK’s urban centers.

Conclusion: KPK’s flooding concerns are technically baseless, as Nowshera and other areas are well above the dam’s reservoir level, and protective measures eliminate backwater risks. The dam would enhance flood control, benefiting KPK.

2. Displacement and Loss of Agricultural Land

Concern: KPK fears that the dam’s reservoir will submerge agricultural land and displace communities, particularly in low-lying areas like Khairabad and Makhad.

Debunking with Technical Details:

Limited Submergence: The dam’s reservoir will submerge 27,500 acres, of which 24,500 acres are in Punjab’s Mianwali District and only 3,000 acres in KPK’s Khairabad and Makhad areas. Of KPK’s submerged land, 74% is barren, per a 1984 WAPDA land survey, minimizing agricultural losses. The submerged fertile land (780 acres) represents less than 0.1% of KPK’s 3.5 million acres of cultivated land, per the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2020).
Displacement Scale: The dam will displace 83,000 people, with 78,000 from Punjab and only 5,000 from KPK, according to WAPDA’s 1987 resettlement plan. This is significantly lower than Tarbela’s displacement (96,000 people), which was successfully managed. KPK’s affected communities will receive compensation, land grants, and resettlement packages, as mandated by the 2008 CCI ruling.
Compensation Precedent: The Tarbela Dam’s resettlement program provided displaced families with 12.5 acres of irrigated land per household, costing $1.2 billion (adjusted for inflation). WAPDA has allocated $500 million for Kalabagh’s resettlement, ensuring comparable support. A 2010 community consultation in Khairabad found 85% of residents willing to relocate with adequate compensation.
Expert Statements: Former WAPDA Chairman Shamsul Mulk, a KPK native, stated in 2018 that “the dam’s impact on KPK is minimal, with full compensation planned for the few affected communities.” A 2012 Lahore High Court ruling emphasized that resettlement must adhere to international standards, ensuring fairness.

Conclusion: KPK’s concerns about land loss and displacement are overstated, as only a small fraction of barren land and a minimal population will be affected, with robust compensation plans in place.

3. Denial of Water Rights

Concern: KPK claims that the dam will prioritize Punjab’s water needs, denying KPK its rightful share and hampering agricultural development.

Debunking with Technical Details:

Equitable Water Sharing: The 1991 Water Apportionment Accord allocates 8.78 MAF to KPK, which the dam’s operation will uphold under IRSA oversight. The dam will provide KPK with an additional 0.35 MAF for irrigation, enabling cultivation of 150,000 acres in southern districts like D.I. Khan and Tank, per WAPDA’s 1984 study.
Irrigation Benefits: KPK’s rain-fed (barani) areas, which constitute 60% of its farmland, suffer from water scarcity. The dam’s regulated flows will support new irrigation channels, boosting yields of wheat, maize, and fruits. A 2014 NUST study estimated a 15% increase in KPK’s agricultural productivity post-dam.
Expert Statements: Dr. Salman Shah noted in 2018 that “KPK stands to gain self-sufficiency in cereals and cash crops through the dam’s irrigation benefits.” The CCI’s 2008 approval of the dam reaffirmed KPK’s water entitlements under the Accord.

Conclusion: The dam will enhance, not reduce, KPK’s water access, supporting agricultural growth and ensuring compliance with the 1991 Accord.

Addressing Broader Political Narratives

Both Sindh and KPK’s concerns are amplified by political narratives that exploit regional identities and historical mistrust. For instance:

Sindh: The PPP and nationalist parties portray the dam as a Punjab-centric project, ignoring technical evidence of Sindh’s benefits. Benazir Bhutto’s 1988 campaign capitalized on anti-dam sentiment, despite her later acknowledgment of its merits.
KPK: The ANP and PTI have used flooding fears to rally voters, with Asfandyar Wali claiming the dam would “drown KPK.” Imran Khan’s 2018 statement against the dam ignored WAPDA’s flood risk assessments.

These narratives persist due to a lack of public engagement. WAPDA’s failure to conduct widespread awareness campaigns has allowed misinformation to dominate. However, technical studies, including those by the World Bank, NUST, and independent panels, consistently affirm the dam’s safety and equity.

Conclusion

The concerns raised by Sindh and KPK regarding the Kalabagh Dam are largely unfounded when examined through a technical lens:

Sindh: Fears of reduced water, desertification, and environmental harm are countered by the dam’s guaranteed 48.76 MAF allocation, 10 MAF environmental flows, and increased irrigation potential (2.2 MAF). Historical grievances are addressed by IRSA’s transparent monitoring and legal safeguards.
KPK: Flooding claims are debunked by elevation data (Nowshera at 975 feet vs. reservoir at 915 feet) and hydraulic modeling, while displacement affects only 5,000 people with robust compensation. The dam will enhance KPK’s irrigation by 0.35 MAF, supporting agricultural growth.

These issues have been politicized through misinformation and regional mistrust, despite extensive studies by WAPDA, the World Bank, and Pakistani experts confirming the dam’s viability. As Shamsul Mulk stated, “Kalabagh Dam is a victim of politics, not engineering.” To overcome opposition, Pakistan must prioritize transparent dialogue, public education, and equitable benefit-sharing, ensuring that technical realities prevail over political narratives.

Recent Developments and Future Prospects

In 2020, the Pakistani government signaled renewed interest in the Kalabagh Dam as part of its long-term energy and water security plans. However, the project remains stalled due to ongoing opposition. The 2022 floods, which devastated Pakistan, reignited debates about the need for dams to manage flood risks and store water. Experts argue that without projects like Kalabagh, Pakistan’s water storage capacity will remain inadequate, especially as Tarbela’s reservoir depletes.

To move forward, proponents suggest:

National Debate Forum: Establishing an impartial platform for inter-provincial dialogue to address concerns transparently.
Public Awareness Campaigns: Educating communities about the dam’s benefits and debunking myths, as proposed by PTI’s government.
Revisiting the Water Apportionment Accord: Ensuring equitable water sharing to allay Sindh’s fears, as directed by the Lahore High Court in 2012.
Bottom-Up Planning: Involving local stakeholders to build trust and ensure fair compensation for displaced communities.

Global Context: Reservoirs Are Lifelines

China: Built over 98,000 dams, with 22,000 large-scale ones.
India: Over 5,100 large dams, with Tehri Dam (3,000 MW) as a key power-water nexus.
USA: Over 90,000 dams, crucial to water storage, irrigation, and power.

In comparison, Pakistan has only 3 major dams, and Kalabagh was supposed to be the fourth cornerstone of national water strategy.

Why Kalabagh is a Technically Great Project

1. Massive Power Potential

Pakistan’s energy shortfall has hovered between 4,000 to 7,000 MW in peak summers. Kalabagh’s 3,600 MW capacity could:

Save Rs. 200 billion annually in furnace oil import costs.
Supply cheap hydropower at around Rs. 2-3 per unit, vs thermal power at Rs. 18-20 per unit.
Stabilize the grid with base load energy and reduce circular debt.

2. Water Storage Crisis

Pakistan has one of the lowest water storage capacities per capita in the world:

Current storage capacity: 13.68 MAF, mainly from Tarbela and Mangla.
Per capita storage: Less than 1,000 cubic meters, nearing “water-scarce” status by UN standards.

Kalabagh Dam would store an additional 6.1 MAF, helping prevent annual freshwater losses of over 30 MAF into the Arabian Sea due to lack of reservoirs.

3. Flood Control

Pakistan suffers chronic flood disasters, like the 2010 floods that caused over $10 billion in damage.

Kalabagh could have mitigated those floods by absorbing peak river flows.
Controlled water release could protect downstream cities, agricultural zones, and infrastructure.

4. Agricultural Boost

Kalabagh could irrigate 800,000 to 1 million acres of currently barren land.
Would stabilize irrigation supplies to southern Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan.
Reduce dependence on groundwater, which is fast depleting and increasingly saline.

Where We Stand in 2025

The project remains shelved.
Pakistan continues to lose over $7 billion annually in lost hydropower, floods, and unutilized water.
Political will is absent despite growing consensus in Punjab and parts of KP.
Alternatives like Diamer-Bhasha and Dasu are under construction but have:
- Higher costs ($14-15 billion+)
- Longer timelines (10-15 years)
- Smaller electricity output compared to Kalabagh for the investment required

Conclusion

The Kalabagh Dam is a technically sound and economically viable project with the potential to address Pakistan’s pressing water, energy, and flood challenges. Its benefits—6.1 MAF of water storage, 3,600 MW of hydropower, $4 billion in annual energy savings, and flood mitigation—are well-documented and supported by decades of studies. However, its progress has been derailed by politicization, driven by inter-provincial mistrust, political opportunism, and misinformation. While systemic issues like weak governance and elite capture contribute to the broader water crisis, the dam’s specific challenges stem from a lack of political will and consensus.

The opposition’s concerns, such as flooding in KPK or water shortages in Sindh, have been addressed by technical studies, yet political narratives persist. To realize the dam’s potential, Pakistan needs a transparent, inclusive approach to build trust among provinces, as suggested by experts like Hafiz Ahsan Ahmad. Without such efforts, the Kalabagh Dam risks remaining a symbol of lost opportunity, exacerbating Pakistan’s vulnerability to water scarcity and economic instability.

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